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Adventures in Rationalism 
 
Michael Della Rocca 
Yale University 
 
I would like to take this occasion to advance and defend, relatively 
informally, what many would think – and indeed what most philosophers would 
think – is a crazy, hopeless view.  And, perhaps it is crazy, but I don’t really care 
if it’s thought to be crazy because I’m a throwback, a throwback to the 17th 
century and also a throwback to the pre-Socratic period, to the time of 
Parmenides.  In other words, I am a shameless rationalist.  The claim I want to 
defend can be seen as the cornerstone of rationalism.  Further, I venture to say 
that this claim is – implicitly – in many ways also the cornerstone of all 
philosophy. 
 
I. Varieties of Rationalism. 
   
But before introducing the specific proposition I want to defend, let’s focus 
on the general thesis – or theses – of rationalism – a venerable movement in 
philosophy, now treated occasionally with respect but only when philosophers 
are not busy studiously ignoring this relic from philosophy’s overly ambitious 
past. 
Rationalism can be many things to many people, and historically 
philosophers who espouse rationalism in one sense of the term, also are 
sympathetic to rationalism in other senses.  Often rationalism is regarded as the 
view that we have so-called innate ideas, ideas that are implanted innately in the 
mind, ideas that perhaps give us a priori access to truths about the world and 
about the nature of modality, about fundamental logical and moral properties, 
etc.1   
The term “rationalism” can also indicate some kind of privileging of modes 
of cognition that are somehow independent of sense experience, a privileging of 
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 so-called a priori modes of cognition over sensory cognition.  On this view, the 
senses are a less reliable means of getting to know truths about the world than 
are non-sensory means or the operations of reason.  Descartes is often seen as 
an example of a rationalist of this variety. And, no wonder: he says in his Second 
Meditation, for example, that both the nature and the existence of bodies are 
better known through the intellect than through the senses.  Plato with his 
frequent derogation of the senses is also a rationalist in this sense. 
These are fine characterizations of rationalism, but I am more interested in 
a related and, I believe, more fundamental form of rationalism.  This form is the 
commitment to the intelligibility of the world and of all the things in the world.  On 
this view, the world and the things in the world are through and through 
intelligible.  Nothing happens for no reason.  On the contrary, whatever takes 
place, whatever exists, takes place or exists for a reason.  Everything.  On this 
view there are no brute facts.  Each thing that exists has a reason that is 
sufficient for explaining the existence of the thing.2  According to perhaps the 
most extreme implication of this view, even the world itself, the totality of all that 
exists, exists for a reason, has an explanation. 
And here we arrive at the claim that will be the focus of this paper, for 
according to this strand of rationalism, rationalism is committed to the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, the PSR, the principle that each thing that exists has an 
explanation, a sufficient reason.  Some philosophers adhere not only to this 
positive version of the PSR, but also to what can be seen as the flip-side or 
negative version of the PSR.  The positive version of the PSR is roughly the 
claim that for each thing that exists, there is an explanation for the fact that it 
exists.  The negative, flip-side version is the claim that if a thing does not exist, 
there must be an explanation for the fact that it does not exist.  Spinoza, for 
example, endorses the PSR in its positive and negative versions: “For each 
thing, there must be assigned a cause or reason both for its existence and for its 
non-existence.”3  This is not primarily an historical essay, but I would be remiss if 
I didn’t point out that the PSR is most famously associated with Leibniz who 
speaks of:  
2
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[The principle] of sufficient reason by virtue of which we consider 
that there can be no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without 
there being a sufficient reason for why it is thus and not otherwise, 
although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us” 
(Monadology §32).4 
 
  The principle has appeared throughout the history of philosophy and has, 
arguably, been endorsed not only be Spinoza and Leibniz, but also by 
Parmenides, Aquinas, Descartes, Hegel, Bradley, and others.  In fact, right up 
until the 18th century the PSR was extremely popular (though its implications 
weren’t fully appreciated), but then something happened and, in a way, 
philosophy has yet to recover.  I will return to this cataclysm that befell 
philosophy soon enough, but before I do so, I hope you can understand why, 
from one point of view, the PSR was so well-loved.  Its popularity was due to its 
breathtaking commitment to the intelligibility of all things.  If philosophy is – as I 
believe it is –  the commitment to finding ourselves and our place in the world 
intelligible, if it is the commitment to making sense of ourselves and the world, 
then what better tool for philosophers to use than the PSR which is, after all, the 
embodiment of the commitment to finding the world intelligible? 
 
 
II. First Application of the PSR: the Non-absoluteness of Space. 
 
Let me mention a few ways in which philosophers have invoked the PSR 
to try to establish bold claims.  It’s natural to turn again to Leibniz.  One use to 
which he put the PSR was to reject the absoluteness of space.  To say that 
space is absolute is to say that space is somehow metaphysically or 
explanatorily prior to the objects in space.  (It’s a question of what’s more 
fundamental: space or the objects in space.)  One can understand space as a 
container independent of the objects in space, as the absolutist about space 
3
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 would hold.  A relationalist about space would hold that facts about space 
depend on the objects in space and that we cannot make sense of space without 
appealing to objects located in space.  Newton was famously an absolutist about 
space.  Leibniz was a great relationalist about space. 
Here’s one of Leibniz’s arguments against absoluteness in his 
correspondence in 1715 and 1716 with Samuel Clarke, a good philosopher in his 
own right and an ally of Newton.  Keep in mind that at this point there was 
already bad blood between Newton and Leibniz (and their followers) concerning 
just who it was that discovered the calculus.  Now they were, through one of 
Newton’s surrogates, engaged in a separate debate about the nature of space. 
Let’s say space is absolute. If so, then space is explanatorily prior to objects in 
space.  If that’s the case, then we can imagine God as confronted with a choice. 
First – and this is a metaphysical “first”, even if not a temporal “first” – space, the 
container is empty.  If God wants to locate a physical object in space, he would 
have no reason to locate it in one place rather than five feet to the left.  Or, God 
would have no reason to orient the object this way rather than that way.  So if 
God does locate the object here rather than there, then God would be acting 
arbitrarily, without a sufficient reason.  God’s action would thus be a brute fact.  
But given the PSR there can be no brute facts.  So there cannot be an absolute 
space, at least there cannot be an absolute space if there are indeed physical 
objects in the world.5 
The argument mentions God, but really God is irrelevant to the argument.  
So, for the moment, forget about God and consider this argument: if space is a 
container and there’s a physical object in space, then what reason is there for 
that object to be here rather than there?  Given the homogeneity of space 
understood as a container, there could be no reason for the object’s being 
located here rather than there.  Thus there would be a brute fact if space is 
absolute and there are objects in space, but given the PSR there can be no brute 
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III. Second Application of the PSR: the Identity of Indiscernibles. 
 
Here’s another use of the PSR: establishing the venerable Principle of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles.  You might think that there can be two things exactly 
alike, with all the same properties, two things that are (as Leibniz puts it) 
indiscernible.  Imagine – and this certainly seems possible – that all there is in 
the universe are two perfect spheres, made of homogenous matter, with the 
same dimensions, five feet away from each other.  But they are two.  Let’s name 
one “A” and the other “B”.  Each of the spheres has all the same properties or so 
it seems – each has the same dimensions, is made of homogenous matter, is 
five feet away from another sphere.  The only thing that seems to differentiate the 
spheres is this: A is not B and B is not A. So why is A not identical to B?  Answer: 
because A is not identical to B.   This answer is correct as far as it goes, but this 
is hardly an illuminating explanation.  Yet, under the circumstances, there seems 
to be no other way to explain the non-identity of A and B, so the non-identity of A 
and B must be a brute fact in such a situation. 
 You might think that the non-identity of the spheres can be illuminatingly 
explained by appealing to the different locations they occupy.  But rather than 
solving the problem, this response merely postpones it, for now we are left to 
ask: what is it in virtue of which the first location is different form the second?  
And, again under the circumstances, there is no difference we can appeal to 
other than the non-identity of the locations themselves.  Again, we arrive at a 
brute fact. 
So, it might seem as if the non-identity of two exactly alike – indiscernible 
– objects would violate the PSR.  The same result would hold for more 
complicated situations, situations involving richer universes with a great variety of 
objects.  The only requirement for generating the problem is that these universes 
be symmetrical have two or more parts, as it were, each of which is a mirror 
image of the other.  
5
Della Rocca: Adventures in Rationalism
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2013
 But if one accepts the PSR and holds that there can be no brute facts, 
then such a universe is impossible. Indeed, more generally, given the PSR, there 
can be no two things exactly alike.  If A and B are exactly alike, then A must be 
identical to B.  This is the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and Leibniz 
explicitly grounds it in the PSR in precisely the way that I have done in the 
correspondence with Clarke and elsewhere.6 
Of course, nowadays, the PII finds few adherents, in part because of the 
cataclysmic events of the 18th century to which I have already alluded.  But for 
now let’s continue to reminisce and look fondly back, as I do, on the time when 
the PSR was ascendant in philosophy. 
 
 
IV. Third Application of the PSR: the Cosmological Argument. 
 
An even more famous way of employing the PSR – to be found in 
Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, and others – is to prove the existence of God.7  This 
is the so-called cosmological argument for the existence of God.  The aim of the 
argument is to show that, given the PSR and certain trivial assumptions, there 
must be a being that is self-explanatory, a being that is the ground of its own 
existence.  From there, it will be a short step, so the argument goes, to show that 
this being is God.   
To carry out this argument, let’s assume that the PSR is true but that there 
is no God or self-explanatory being.  Throw in the following trivial assumptions:  
something exists, e.g. me whom we shall unimaginatively call “A”.  Let’s see how 
far we can get while avoiding the claim that there is a self-explanatory thing.  So 
assume that this something, A, is not self-explanatory, is not the ground of its 
own existence.  But since A is not self-explanatory then, given the PSR, it must 
be grounded in something else, B.  Again, if we want to avoid the conclusion that 
there is a self-explanatory being, we must say that B is not self-explanatory.  OK, 
so given the PSR, it’s clear that we are off on an infinite regress.  But this regress 
seems not to be problematic: we have an infinite series of dependent, non-self-
6
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 explanatory beings and no self-explanatory being, no being that is the ground of 
its own existence.  This regress – though infinite – seems not to be at all vicious; 
there seems to be no explanatory question left unanswered. 
But wait! There may be one more being that we must consider.  This is not 
any member of the series of dependent beings, i.e. the series of beings that are 
dependent on other beings, but rather the series of all dependent beings itself.  
What is the explanation of the whole series?  The PSR allows us to ask that 
question, and it demands an answer.  So what is the reason for the existence of 
the whole series of dependent beings?  This question is a form of the traditional 
question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”  Let’s say that a big bag 
– an infinite bag – is placed around the whole series of dependent beings – or 
that the series itself is a bag.   Given the PSR, there must be a reason for the 
bag and this reason itself must be a being, a thing.  Is the reason for the bag 
dependent on something else or is the reason for the bag itself self-explanatory?  
Well, it can’t be dependent on something else because the bag is the entire 
series of dependent beings.  The bag contains all dependent beings, so if the 
reason for the bag itself is a dependent being, then the reason for the bag itself 
depends only on itself, and this would contradict the assumption that the reason 
is dependent on other beings.  So the assumption that the reason for the bag is a 
dependent being leads to a contradiction.  So the reason for the bag must be 
self-explanatory and thus this being must be independent. 
Of course, we may be able to avoid this conclusion.  I spoke glibly of the 
series, the infinite series, of dependent beings as a bag, as if the series were an 
object in its own right, but perhaps the collection of all dependent things is not 
itself a thing.  And so, because the explanatory demand kicks in only when we 
have a thing, no explanation is required for the series of dependent beings.  
Perhaps this is so, but – one has to ask in the spirit of the PSR – in virtue of what 
would this series not count as a thing or object?  Perhaps an answer could be 
developed, but the burden, I think is on those who claim that the series is not an 
object.  At any rate, even if we grant that the series is not itself an object, we can 
still advance the rationalist argument by appealing to facts instead of things.  If 
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 we look at the series of dependent things, we can ask – as the PSR demands – 
what is the explanation of the fact that there is such a series.  What explains the 
remarkable fact that there is – as one might put it – something rather than 
nothing?  The explanation of this remarkable fact must appeal to some thing or 
fact other than the existence of dependent beings and, once again, it’s hard to 
see how to avoid the path from the series of dependent things to the existence of 
an independent, self-explanatory being or to the fact that an independent being 
exists. 
Leibniz and others go on to say that the independent being is God, but, for 
our purposes, we needn’t follow the argument this far.  For us, it is enough that 
the PSR helps us to reach the surprising conclusion that there must be a being 
that is the reason for its own existence. 
 
 
V. Fourth Application of the PSR: Monism. 
 
One of the most exotic apparent implications of the PSR is monism, 
indeed a rather strong version of monism. Roughly, monism in this form is the 
thesis that there is only one thing in the world, viz. the world itself, and all the 
distinctions among the things – the apparent things – we know and love, things 
like you and me and the chair and the dog and the rock and Taylor Swift – are 
somehow not real, somehow illusory. 
Here’s one quick way to reach this very controversial conclusion.  The 
argument concerns the nature of relationality, what it is for two or more things to 
stand in a relation.  Consider, for example, the relation of being five feet away 
from something.   This relation may hold between two objects, say, between me 
and the door, or between objects A and B.  Call this relation, R.  It seems very 
natural to say that relations such as R must be grounded in or explained by some 
thing or things.  Certainly the PSR would demand such an explanation: relations, 
like all other things, stand in need of explanation. 
8
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 It also seems very natural to say that a relation is grounded in its relata, 
i.e. in the things, A and B, that stand in this relation.  In the case at hand, the 
relation between A and B would somehow be grounded in, explained by, A and 
B.  But exactly how is the relation grounded in A and B? 
First, it seems wrong to say that R is grounded in A alone to the exclusion 
of B.  The PSR can help us see why such one-sided grounding is illegitimate.  To 
say that R is grounded in A alone seems unfair and arbitrary because B has an 
equal claim to be a ground of R.  If A alone has the honor of grounding R, this 
would seem to be a fact that holds for no reason, a brute fact, and thus 
something that the PSR would not countenance.  Similarly, the relation R cannot 
be grounded in B alone. 
So perhaps the relation is grounded not in A alone or in B alone, but in A 
and B together. Fair enough, but this seems to introduce a new difficulty, one that 
is familiar from our discussion of the cosmological argument.  We are trying to 
explain a relation R and to do so we need, it seems, to appeal to a further 
relation, to the fact that A and B co-exist, they are together. 
But now what explains the co-existence of A and B, what explains the fact 
that this further relation holds between A and B?  To explain the “togetherness” 
of A and B, the coexistence of A and B, we can’t appeal, it seems once again, to 
A alone or to B alone.  Instead we must appeal to A and B together, i.e. to the 
fact that A and B co-exist and stand in a certain relation, and here we get into a 
circle: we’ve explained the coexistence of A and B, a certain relation between A 
and B, by appealing to that very relation.  This is hardly an illuminating 
explanation.  The PSR would demand a more robust explanation.8 
It seems that R – a relation between A and B – cannot be legitimately 
grounded, cannot be legitimately explained.  But the PSR, of course, demands 
such an explanation.  What’s the result then?  It can only be that the relation – 
apparently between A and B – is not genuine.  A and B do not really stand in this 
relation R after all.  This is shocking, and it’s even more shocking when we 
realize that R was just an example, just a stand-in for any relation.  The general 
point is that all relations are not genuine, are in need of grounding or explanation 
9
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 which they cannot obtain.  In particular, the relation of distinctness between “two” 
objects, any relation of non-identity, is not legitimate because such relations of 
non-identity are, like any other relations, incapable of being grounded. 
So, given the PSR, there can be no relations of non-identity, no relations 
of distinctness, and thus there can at most be only one thing.  (I’ll return to this 
“at most” later.).  Any multiplicity of things would bring with it relations – at least 
relations of distinctness – which are, as we’ve just seen illegitimate.  So there 
can be no genuine multiplicity of things and thus there is at most only one thing.  
This is a version of monism and the argument I have just given is, in effect, the 
argument the British Idealist, F.H. Bradley, gave for monism in his great and 
almost unreadable book, Appearance and Reality.  Arguably, Parmenides also 
accepts this form of monism (though he does not explicitly invoke relations).9 
Let me say a bit about what this version of monism entails and does not 
entail.  This version of monism entails that the only genuine thing is the world 
itself (if there is anything at all).  But that’s not to say that the familiar objects we 
know and sometimes love are not real at all. It may be the case that we can find 
some kind of place for such ordinary objects in our ontology as long as we 
acknowledge that this multiplicity is not fully real, that because it is not fully 
intelligible it does not fully exist.  But this multiplicity may be intelligible to some 
degree and exist to some degree.  What the monistic point of view suggests is 
that the distinctions we may see or think we see among the thing we know are 
not fully real.  What the monistic point of view also suggests is that all the reality 
that is legitimately contained in A and B and you and me is fully captured by the 
whole undifferentiated cosmos or world itself.  When we take up this point of view 
– this point of view of reality as a whole – we do lose sight of the distinctions 
between things, but to lose sight of these distinctions is not to lose sight of 
something fully intelligible for distinctions, like all relations, are not genuine, they 
are not real.  This monistic conclusion may seem to do damage to our sense of 
our individuality, but it does so only by telling us that whatever reality our 
individuality might be thought to have is captured better and more accurately by 
appealing to the one whole without any genuine differentiation in it. 
10
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 VI. The Cataclysm of Pure Reason. 
 
The ethical implications of this monism are considerable and, for this 
reason, Spinoza called his major work, the Ethics.  There are, e.g., implications 
for the way in which we should be concerned for the world itself as opposed to 
being concerned about ourselves, that is, as opposed to being concerned about 
how things look from our limited and inevitably distorting perspective.  But I won’t 
explore these ethical implications here.  I have merely wanted to articulate the 
breath-taking heights to which the PSR might be thought to lead.  These heights 
are, of course, nevertheless extremely counterintuitive.  It’s counterintuitive to 
embrace, as the proponent of the PSR should, the Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles, the existence of a self-explanatory being, and some form of 
monism.  In light of these implications of the PSR, it’s no wonder that most 
philosophers nowadays simply reject the PSR if they bother to consider it at all. 
Ironically, the aversion to the PSR, to the view that all is intelligible 
solidified around the time of the Enlightenment, the Age of Reason, with such 
thinkers as Hume and Kant.  Both of these great philosophers subject the PSR to 
withering attack and both make it their mission to limit the pretensions of the 
PSR.10  
I cannot go into Hume’s and Kant’s reasons for rejecting the PSR here.  
But briefly I can say that Hume sees – perhaps more clear-headedly than almost 
any rationalist – how the PSR leads to extremely counterintuitive consequences, 
consequences that he sees as “hideous”.  On this basis, he comes to reject the 
PSR. In particular, Hume sees that the PSR entails monism. He regards monism 
as obviously false, and so he rejects the PSR.  This is a very simple and powerful 
argument against the PSR, one whose full signficance has not yet, I believe, 
been fully appreciated. 
Kant also clearly sees the power and the problems with the full-blown, 
unrestricted use of the PSR.  He recognizes that unintelligibility and indeed 
contradictions may result from an unfettered PSR.  And, perhaps unlike Hume, 
Kant seeks not to reject the PSR entirely but to clip its wings.  For Kant, the best 
11
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 way to do this – a way that simultaneously safeguards human knowledge and 
human freedom – is to limit the PSR to the explanation of matters in the realm of 
our experience and to deny that the PSR could lead to justified conclusions or 
knowledge about matters that transcend the evidence of our senses.  And so, for 
this reason, Kant claimed that philosophy in the grip of the PSR is not able, as 
Leibniz and others hope, to prove the existence of God and that philosophy is not 
able to prove, as Spinoza claims, that the world is a unified, monistic whole. 
After Hume’s and Kant’s criticisms, most philosophers agreed that the 
ambitions of pure reason must be limited in something like the way Kant 
suggests. And so, with Hume’s and Kant’s criticisms of the PSR, the PSR came 
to fall more or less into disrepute.  These events were, as I like to think of them, 
the cataclysm of pure reason. 
 
 
VII. Fifth Application of the PSR: Necessitarianism. 
 
But perhaps the most devastating argument against the PSR came much 
later – this argument solidified many of the intuitive reactions against the PSR 
from the very beginning and helped to make concrete Kant’s concerns about how 
the PSR leads to the denial of human freedom.  A standard worry about the PSR 
had been that the PSR, if true, would mean that all truths are necessary truths.  If 
all truths are necessary truths, then it’s hard to see how very many of our most 
fundamental beliefs can be true.  We believe that I might have worn a blue shirt 
today instead of a white shirt, that Obama might have lost the 2012 election, etc.  
But if necessitarianism – the thesis that all truths are necessary truths – is true, 
then these “might have” claims cannot be correct.  One thing that’s wrong with 
necessitarianism is that it seems to conflict with our conviction that some of our 
actions can be free and can be actions for which should be held responsible and 
praised or blamed.  And this is because praise and blame and responsibility and 
freedom seem to require alternative possibilities of action.  But if there are no 
alternative possibilities, if things could not have been different in any respect – as 
12
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 necessitarianism requires – then there seems to be no freedom, etc. and this is 
very upsetting. 
What is the argument that the PSR leads to necessitarianism?  Let’s 
assume that the PSR is true but there are some contingent truths, some truths 
that are not necessary.  Let’s say that p is such a contingent truth.  Given the 
PSR, p must have a reason.  But since we are supposing that p is contingent and 
not necessary, the reason for p must be some proposition other than p.  OK, let’s 
say the reason is q.  Let’s assume, further, that since q is the reason for p, q 
necessitates p.  That is, in general the reason for a truth necessitates that truth.  
Some philosophers deny that reasons necessitate, but I am prepared to defend 
this claim, though I do not have the space to do so here.  Now q which 
necessitates p is either necessary or contingent.  If q is necessary then since q 
entails p, p would, contrary to our assumption, be necessary, not contingent, 
after all.  So the reason for p, viz. q, must be contingent as well.  But what then is 
the reason for q?  Let’s say that the reason is r.  OK, but again we face the same 
issue: is r necessary or contingent? If it’s necessary, then q which is entailed by r 
must be necessary after all and similarly p must be necessary.  If r is contingent, 
then we must look to the reason for r and the regress of contingent truths 
continues. 
So if we are to preserve genuine contingency along with the PSR, we 
must have an infinite series of contingent propositions.  So far, so good.  We 
don’t yet have to say that the PSR entails that all truths are necessary. 
But now step back and consider not p, q, r taken by themselves, but rather 
the vast conjunction of all contingent truths.  The conjunction includes p, q, r and 
many more propositions.  Let’s call this big conjunction C.  (This is like the bag of 
dependent beings we saw earlier.)  Given the PSR, C must have a reason. Call 
this reason RC.  If RC is necessary, then since RC, the reason for C, 
necessitates C and thus necessitates p, q, r, etc., all those others propositions – 
as necessitated by a necessary proposition – would themselves be necessary.  
So there would be no contingent propositions after all, and all would be 
necessary. Thus if we are going to maintain genuine contingency, then we must 
13
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 say that RC, the reason for the vast conjunctive proposition, must not be 
necessary.  But if RC is not necessary, then it’s contingent and so it’s a 
component of the vast conjunctive proposition.  In this case, RC – as the reason 
for the vast conjunctive proposition containing all contingent truths including RC 
itself – would be the reason for itself.  But a proposition that explained itself could 
not fail to be true because it is not contingent on any other truths.  Thus RC, if 
contingent, would be the reason for itself and would thus be necessary after all.  
So RC cannot be contingent because the assumption that it is leads to the 
conclusion that it is necessary.  But, as we’ve seen, neither can RC be 
necessary.  So RC can neither be necessary nor contingent.  There can, then, be 
no true proposition RC.  So there can after all be no reason for C.  But this goes 
against the PSR.  So given the PSR, we must give up the assumption that there 
is a conjunction of contingent truths and that there are contingent truths.  All 
truths are necessary.11 
Few people – if any – want to be this extreme and that’s why people find it 
easier simply to deny the PSR and deny that all is intelligible than to embrace the 
claim that all truths are necessary.  (This is what van Inwagen does.) Of course, 
to meekly accept that not everything is intelligible is really, I think, to give up the 




IX. An Argument for the PSR. 
 
And that’s how things stand.  Until now.  For I want to offer a kind of 
argument for the PSR.  The argument is very simple, yet, I think, very powerful.  
The argument, like so much of philosophy, aims to put you in a difficult position:  
either you have to embrace the PSR (and necessitarianism, etc.) OR you have to 
give up some claims that all or most rational beings are loath to give up.  Once 
we see the power of this argument for the PSR, there will be one final twist that 
puts everything in a very different light. 
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 To begin the argument for the PSR, I say: forget about the PSR, and just 
focus on some intuitively very plausible and, indeed, wildly popular arguments.  I 
call these arguments explicability arguments.12 
I will offer a series of explicability arguments.  The first argument is what 
may be called the Archimedes argument.  Here we have the welcome 
opportunity to appeal once again to Leibniz’s correspondence with Clarke where 
Leibniz says: 
 
[Archimedes] takes it for granted that if there is a balance in which 
everything is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on 
the two ends of that balance, the whole will be at rest.  That is 
because no reason can be given why one side should weigh down 
rather than the other. (p. 321) 
. 
It seems plausible to say that in this situation, the whole balance will be at 
rest and to say this for precisely the reason that Leibniz indicates: if the beam 
should lean to one side or the other, there would be no reason for it to do so.  
This is an explicability argument for it claims, rather plausibly, that a certain state 
of affairs cannot obtain – the state of affairs in which the beam in not balanced – 
because that situation would bring with it a fact that is intolerably inexplicable.  
The rejection of inexplicability in this situation is not a commitment to the full-
blown rejection of inexplicability, to the unrestricted PSR, but the plausibility of 
this particular explicability argument can lead us to ask: how far does this 
concern with avoiding inexplicability go? 
So let’s turn to another case: this is a case of fission.  Here I turn to a 
famous example from Parfit.13  A person’s brain – it could be my brain, but to 
preserve anonymity let’s call this person “A” – is cut in half and each of the 
halves is placed in a different and new body.  Amazingly, due to an unexpected 
redundancy in brain function, the newly embodied half-brains result in persons in 
the different new bodies that are exactly like A both with regard to memory and 
character traits, etc.  Let’s call the two subsequent people, “B” and “C”. 
15
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 Is A identical to B or to C?  A certainly cannot be identical to both B and C.  
After all, B and C are not, it seems, identical to each other, and thus, given the 
transitivity of identity, A cannot be identical with both B and C.  Can we say then 
that A is identical to B in particular as opposed to being identical to C?  It would 
seem that it would be arbitrary for A to be identical to B and not to C since C has 
as good a claim as B does to being identical to A.  Any identity of A with B or with 
C seems objectionably arbitrary and so any such identity should be rejected.  
This is precisely the conclusion that Parfit draws. 
The point here need not involve a science fiction example.  We can reach 
a similar result by looking at real-life examples of fission involving amoebae.  
Thus David Wiggins says, “since neither [of the resulting amoebae in a case of 
fission] has a better claim than the other, no sensible theory will want to count 
either amoeba as identical with the original one”.14 
Once we identify the phenomenon of explicability arguments, we can find 
them everywhere in philosophy and their pervasiveness only increases the 
pressure on us to address the question of whether explicability arguments in 
general are legitimate and whether one can, as it were, go all the way with 
explicability arguments and embrace the full-blown PSR. 
A particularly instructive case of an explicability argument concerns the 
nature of causation.  What is causation?  It seems natural to demand an account, 
an explanation of what causation is.  What is it in virtue of which one collection of 
events counts as a causal series and another collection does not? Many 
philosophers, such as Hume, hold that there must be an answer to this question -
- that it would be unacceptable for there to be nothing in virtue of which a 
collection of events counts as causal.  In so demanding an explanation of what 
causation is, these philosophers are saying that a certain situation in which 
causation has, in effect, no nature is unacceptable because such a situation 
would make a given phenomenon – causation – unintelligible. 
Similar demands for explanations of certain phenomena are made in the 
case of consciousness (“what is consciousness?”), necessity (“what is 
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 necessity?”), moral goodness and rightness (“what are goodness and 
rightness?”), and many others. 
Still, even if we accept these demands, there is no argument yet for the 
PSR itself – that is, until we turn to one final phenomenon, viz. existence itself.  
For we are naturally led to ask, just as we might demand an account, an 
explanation, of what causation is, what consciousness is, what necessity is, and 
just as we might advance all the other explicability arguments that I mentioned, 
so too we might demand an explanation of existence itself.  Just as we might ask 
what is it in virtue of which a causal sequence is a causal sequence, so too we 
might ask what is it in virtue of which a thing that exists exists.  What is 
existence, we might ask (that’s a paradigmatic philosophical question), just as we 
might ask what is causation, what is consciousness, what is goodness, etc.  In 
asking these questions and demanding answers, we are appealing to 
explicability arguments.  So, given the other cases of explicability arguments that 
we accept, there is pressure on us to accept the explicability argument in the 
case of existence.  Indeed, the pressure amounts to an argument for accepting 
the demand for explicability in the case of existence.  If we are going to resist this 
pressure – resist this argument for the claim that existence itself has an 
explanation – we must find a legitimate way to draw the line between the 
explicability arguments we accept, as in the case of fission or causation or 
whatever, and the one we want to resist in the case of existence. 
Resisting this pressure becomes even more urgent once we recognize 
that the explicability argument concerning existence is really an argument for the 
PSR itself.  For, recall that the PSR is (on one version) the claim that for each 
thing that exists, there must be something in virtue of which it exists, there must 
be an explanation for its existence.  In endorsing the explicability argument 
concerning existence, we are presupposing that for each thing that exists, there 
is something in virtue of which it exists, i.e. we are presupposing the PSR itself.  
And thus the pressure to accept the explicability argument concerning existence 
is really an argument for the PSR itself.  To resist this argument, we must, again, 
draw a line between this explicability argument and the others that we accept.  
17
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 But this line must be principled, it must not be arbitrary.  For if it were an arbitrary 
line, then the line itself would be a brute fact, and, in the context of trying to rebut 
an argument for the PSR, we must not invoke any brute facts because that would 
be to beg the question.  One cannot legitimately appeal to a brute fact in order to 
rebut an argument for the PSR, for the claim that there are no brute facts, 
because so appealing would be like appealing to the claim that Big Foot exists in 
order to rebut an argument for the claim that Big Foot does not exist.  You cannot 
simply assume that Big Foot exists while trying to challenge an argument that Big 
Foot does not exist.  Similarly, one cannot appeal to a brute fact – a brute line 
between explicability arguments – in attempting to challenge an argument that 
there are no brute facts. 
So the dialectic dictates that in order to rebut an argument for the PSR, 
one must find a principled line between the explicability arguments that we 
accept and the explicability argument concerning existence that the opponent of 
the PSR needs to reject. 
But what would such a principled line be?  For the life of me, I cannot find 
one and it’s not for lack of trying.  A number of others have tried in conversation 
or correspondence to find such a line and have, I believe, failed as well. 
So where does this leave us?  The sequence of explicability arguments 
generates an argument for the PSR that we have not been able to rebut.  It 
follows that there is genuine unrebutted pressure on us to accept the PSR, a 
principle with extreme consequences, concerning, as we have seen, monism and 
the identity of indiscernibles and the existence of a necessary being and much 
else – a principle that almost all philosophers want to reject but have not yet in 
my opinion found a legitimate way to reject.  This, then, is my positive, 
unrebutted argument for the PSR. 
 
X.  Whiplash. 
 
But now – at the risk of incurring whiplash – let me try one more desperate 
move on behalf of someone who wants to resist the PSR.  This is, in effect, the 
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 nuclear option for an opponent of the PSR – and from one perspective it just 
might work.  To see this option, let’s return to monism and the argument for it.  
Recall that I argued for monism by appealing to a Bradleyan argument 
concerning relations.  Relations are unintelligible because there’s no way to 
ground them properly.  This was a PSR-style argument.  I employed this 
argument to show that there are no intelligible relations of distinctness and hence 
that at most there is one thing.  But now I want to focus on this “at most” and ask: 
is there even one thing? 
For there to be one thing, that thing must be intelligible and it must be 
intelligible in terms of its properties – how else can a thing be understood unless 
you appeal to some features, some properties, of the thing in terms of which we 
can articulate the thing, make it intelligible. 
But then it seems that the intelligibility of the one thing (and of anything, 
really) requires a distinction between the thing and its properties.  Notice that I 
just said “distinction”.  But as we saw, the PSR-argument concerning relations 
shows that distinctions in general are ruled out.  So since for a thing to be 
intelligible there must be a distinction between it and its properties, and since 
there can be no such distinction, it follows that no thing is intelligible.  Given the 
PSR, then, which requires that, in order for a thing to exist, it must be intelligible, 
there can be no thing, there can exist no thing.  This result is perhaps a kind of 
nihilism, the thesis that no thing exists.  But really it’s also a very rich view 
because, as we saw, by rejecting distinctions which are unintelligible, we 
advance to a more intelligible view of reality.  What we lose in terms of things or 
objects we more than make up in terms of intelligibility.  The PSR, it turns out, 
may lead beyond pluralism and even beyond monism and beyond nihilism.  
Does this show that the PSR is false?  No, not necessarily.  For if the PSR 
is false, what could ground its falsity?  There seem to be no things available to 
ground the falsity of the PSR.  But, equally, it is hard to see how the PSR can be 
true.  For a claim to be true that claim must be grounded (as the PSR requires) in 
some thing or things.  Things, it seems, ground truths – or so the PSR would lead 
us to believe.  But then what would ground the purported truth of the PSR itself?  
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 If the PSR is true, then (perhaps) nihilism is true and if nihilism is true, nothing 
can serve as the ground of the PSR or any other purported truth, including the 
“truth” of nihilism itself.  The PSR thus seems to lead to the undermining of itself 
and of all other purported truths.  Again, this doesn’t mean that the PSR is false 
for just as there are no things to ground the truth of the PSR there are no things 
to ground its falsity.  But this result does mean that we have moved not only 
beyond pluralism and multiplicity, but beyond monism, and perhaps beyond truth 
and falsity.  This is where the PSR and our rationalist adventures eventually lead 
– to a position that we may not even be able to rationally articulate – to a position 
(if we can call it that!) that seems to overturn the very notions of truth and falsity. 
The PSR, I have argued, is surprisingly superior to and more intelligible 
than any view that denies the PSR.  But the PSR also points to its own ultimate 
inadequacy.  It is, as it might seem, a ladder that – once we have climbed it – we 
must kick away.  And then, as Wittgenstein says in a not unrelated context15, we 
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